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IN'rRODTJCT ION 
The Odyss(ey of Consciousness 
The System of Transcendental Id,ealism, written late 
in l'799 and published .in 1800, is by far the most 
polished ,and compl,ete of the works that sc:helling pub­
lished -wlt.bin his lifetime,. In its :breadth, clarity and 
integrity the 'Work justifies the sudden fame it bro,ugbt 
its young author. Ironically , this work which for 'the 
next decad,e ,established Schelling's position at the pin­
nacl,e of German philosophy and pr,ovided him the pl,atf,orm 
for eLa'borating the first system of absolut~ idealism 'i:s 
far f:ro:m the most original of his writings~ l I :n th,e 
main, it belongs to the early work,s, the phi.los,ophical 
apprenticeship undrer Fichte. The system, in ,fa,c 't" main,­
tains its conti'nuity with the r ,est of Sche.11:ing 's philo·­
sophy only in its muted voicing of certain themes which 
elsewher,e attain thei,r proper development--thermes :sud'! 
as the r ,eali ty and ultimacy ,of nature .:in an idealist.i,c 
perspective, natur,e' s function as the grouind and anti­
type of spirit, the self-identity of the il\bsolwte wit:hin 
rdispersed finite being, the coinrceptua.l though uncon­
scious ,elem,ent in art, and philosophy's tasrk of constriu.rct­
ing .a g,eneral metaphy.sics upon the model of tnnna:n f ,r ,eedom. 
It is pr,edominantly a work of ,oonsolidatio,n, not of 
Schelling ' s own p:r,evi,ous philosophy., but of the t:raditi,on 
of transcendental idealism, the posiltion sugigested in 
Ka:nt is three Critiques and el,evated into an epistemolo,gy 
a jnd ,general methodology in Fi,cht,e 's Science of K1nowled,ge. 
Schelling is cle,ar on the kind of consolidation nee,ded~ 
Th1e most g,eneral proof of the over.all ideali ty 
of knowledge is therefore that carried out in the 
Science of Knowledge, by immediate i :nfe.rence from 
the proposition I am. There Ls yet another proof 
of it possible, however, namely, the factual,, which 
in ·a ,syst,em o .f transce\ndental id,.e;alism is carried 
out in the very process of actually deducing t!he 
entire 'System of knowledge from the principle in 
question. (System, p. 34} 
1schelling's System became known to the English-speaking wor.Ld 
throug1h Colerirdge•s Biograp!hia Liter,aria, which drew heavily upon 
it and othe·r ,early essays ,of Schellin1g :for a ·forty,-page critique of 
p:ercep,bual realism.. The .ada,ptati,on t.oo'k the :fonn both of d,irect 
transl,atlon and of paraphrase, with scant admowLedgeme.nt o.f the 
exact sources,. The criti,c's laxity late·r ,gave rise to charges of 
plagiarism, For a comparison of Ooleridge•s be:xt and its sources 
,se,e G. Ot'sini 1 Co1,e,dLdge and Ge.r:man Idealism (Carbondale ,, Ill. ., 
196'9) , pp.. ].98-2:21. 
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Schelling's predecessors had enunciated the principle 
that the togetherness of subject and object, of presenta­
tion and thing, can be founded only in self-consciousness 
or its constitutive activity, imagination. Fichte called 
this unitive consciousness the 'self' or the 'I.' What 
remains is to erove this theoretical position, to see the 
abstract principle of the subjectivity of all known being 
verified in a system of idealism . This system would give 
flesh and substance to the stance of a perceptual and 
cognitive idealism by demonstrating that the objective 
world in the totality of its being and its operations is 
a process of emergence from the self and its activities, 
~ most basicafly presentation. The world in its objectivity, 
in its sensible singularity and its generality as nature, 
and also this objectivity spiritualized as the human 
community living under law, subject to time and history-­
this whole world is to be constructed from the self's 
fundamental quality, fr~edom or activity. "Freedom is 
the one principle on which everything is supported, and 
what we behold in the objective world is not anything 
present outside us, but merely the inner limitation of 
our own free activity" (p. 35). The system Schelling 
proposes is to annex to the idealism of this epistemo­
logical and metaphysical principle a 'real-philosophy,' 
a total and faithful account of the objectivity of the 
physical world and of the human structures of experience 
and social sharing. Or better, its task is to prove the 
identity of transcendental idealism and real-philosophy, 
and thus to elevate transcendental philosophy into an 
'ideal-realism' (p. 41) . 
In his 1827 Munich lectures Towards a History of 
Recent Philosophy Schelling reluctantly underscores the 
non-originality of his 1800 System, its dependence on 
"Fichtean Idealism" and on the principle first enun­
ciated by Fichte that freedom must ground all philosophy, 
For it was Fichte who discovered that the Kantian auton- . 
orny of self founds not only practical or moral philosophy 
but also theoretical philosophy, the account of knowledge 
and being (S.W., X, 96) ,2 But the one-time disciple and 
popularizer"ot Fichte now maintains that he came to his 
own method while working under this "cloak of Fichtean 
thought."3 The essence of this method consists in the 
clarification "of that which is utterly independent of 
our freedom, the presentation of an objective world which 
~on-English Schelling references are to the Samtliche 
Werke, ed. K. F. A. Schelling, 1856 f., reproduced in the Munich 
Jubilee Edition, ed. M, Schroter, 1927 . The first numeral indicates 
the volume, the second the page. 
3schelling definitively broke from Fichte in 1806, though 
the two were in substantial disagreement from 1800 on. 
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indeed restricts our freedom, through a process in which 
the self sees itself develop through a necessary but not 
consciously observed act of self-positing" (S .W., X, 97). 
This process, unnamed in 1800, is now given the name 
dialectic--Schelling insinuates that credit for the dis­
covery of "the dialectic" is popularly misplaced, 
In this dialectic or clarificatory process the 
PQSiting and self-expanding activity of the self and the 
limitation of that activity are seen to be both and 
~ually the self's activity. · The self is pr'IinorcITally 
th activity and limitation; inside the process it con­
sciously makes itself to be both, i.e., the self itself 
makes itself to be both subject and object, finite and 
infinite. The self is doubled in that it appears to 
itself; it loses the abstract simplicity of the Fichtean 
self-positing (I= I); it ceases to be in-itself and 
becomes for-itself. As Schelling explains it in 1827, 
inside the dialectical process, which is the system, the 
self returns f~ !_imi tat~~--to _li_s or,igj,naL f_:r_ee.g~nd 
for the hrst time becomes for itself (or in the System's 
l~ccmsc .rou s .1y,--:wna1:-·11:- .:rrre~--~ n_ i s e 1 f , 
namely pure freedom or acfivity:- Schelling further 
remark's'1: at th1 one process makes up the whole mechanism 
of the system. What in a preceding moment is posited in 
consciousness (i.e., is admitted as real) only for the 
philosopher, is in the succeeding moment raised in the 
self itself; in the end the objective self (the self 
itself, the subject of experience) is raised to the 
standpoing of philosophizing consciousness and the two 
coincide (s.w., x, 98). 
That this was indeed Schelling's method and intent 
is evident from a reading of the System, though often the 
'method' seems a clumsy didactic device and hardly the 
simple mirroring of a process inside consciousness. The 
claim that this dialectical procedure is his method 
rather than Fichte's is plainly extravagant,4 although 
the System's main advantage over the Science of Knowledge 
is the adoption of this one method over the three or four 
that Fichte variously employs.5 It is, at least in 
4Por Fichte's statements on science as the dialectic of the 
philosophizing and the objective self see Science of Knowledge, tr. 
Heath and Lachs (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), pp. 113, 120-21, 
198-202. Also see the "Second Introduction to the Science of Know­
ledge,"~- cit., sections 5, 7, and particularly 9 and 11. 
51n the 1794 Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge 
the first three sect~ons on the ground-principles employ a deduc­
tive approach; the theoretical philosophy adopts an analytic and 
metaphysical method of exploring ·the possible factors inside the 
one real synthesis of experience; the cryptic "Deduction of Presen­
tation" (pp. 203-17) a descriptive and (abortively) synthetic 
method; and the practical philosophy a method at once synthetic 
xiv System of Transcendental Idealism 
general form, the same method that Hegel was to take up 
and perfect in the Phenomenology of Spirit , and not the 
method alone, but the ordering of the strata of experi­
ence determined by it. It seems difficult, if not 
impossible, to understand the order of experiential 
levels in the Phenomenology from Hegel's transitions 
alone ·, without the pattern of materials inherited from 
Fichte and Schelling before one's eyes. The pattern of 
the S?stem indicates the road that Hegel was to follow, 
viz. rom theory to praxis, from the individual con­
sciousness to the objective social order , and from a 
world-embedded consciousness to a philosophically reflec­
tive one. But it shows, too, the Kantian and Fichtean 
systems which lie at its origin. Here is the System's 
basic structure: 
(1) A general consideration of self-consciousness, 
dialectic and the methodology of the system--Parts I and 
II, Part III in part; pages 1-47 . 
(2) A theoretical philosophy: the deduction of 
cognitive phenomena ranging from rudimentary (and pro­
perly unconscious) presentation up to the categories 
generally necessary to secure objectivity for experience-­
Part III , pages 47-154. 
(3) A (sketchily outlined) philosophy of nature, 
contained within the theoretical philosophy, in which 
cognitive phenomena are seen of necessity to involve a 
reflection and validation in an objective intuited 
order, viz. nature--Part III, First Epoch (conclusion) 
and Second Epoch; pages 83-129. 
(4) A transcendental analysis of cognitive and 
judgmental faculties, aga·in contained within the theore­
tical philosophy. Here the previous stages of the self's 
activity, viz. as productive intuition and as matter 
organized in nature, are seen to be equally grounded in 
free reflection or self-relation, the activity which in 
practical philosophy emerges on its own as will--Part 
III, pages 129-54. 
(5) A practical philosophy which advances from the 
perceptual and volitional solipsism implicit in the 
theoretical standpoint to a deduction of the rational 
human community as guarantor both of the objectivity of 
· the world of experience and the ideality (value) of the 
moral order--Part IV, pages 155-93. 
(6) A philosophy of history contained within the 
practical philosophy and evidencing the objectivity of 
will, much as the philosophy ~f nature does in the 
and genetic--i.e,, once the category of feeling is introduced, 
we watch the actual growth of consciousness. Ironically, Fichte 
was to criticize the System for a lack of dialectical rigor 
(Letter of the Summer of 1801, Fichte-Schelling Br iefwechsel, 
ed. w. Schulz [Frankfurt a. M., 1968] , p. 126) . 
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theoretical philosophy. Here practical philosophy, 
having deduced the moral, legal and political orders of 
social existence, finds its subject matter (will) 
existing as objectified in history and as necessarily 
and collectively moving toward the ideal fulfilment of 
world polity--Part IV, pages 193-214. 
(7) An extra-systematic concluding section, in­
cluding a (negligently sketched) teleology and a philo­
sophy of art, wherein certain abiding problems of the 
system, e.g., the inaccessibility of the Absolutely 
Identical or absolute self-consciousness, and the recourse 
to a hypothesis of a pre-established harmony of freedom 
and determinism, receive a solution of sorts. Aesthetic 
intuition is seen to be the counterpart of philosophical 
intuition and to provide an access to the hidden identity 
which was both the ground and the goal of striving for 
the consciousness torn throughout the whole dialectic 
between intuition and production--Parts V and VI, pages 
215-33, 
The final section is extra-systematic since on the 
Fichtean model of consciousness--an activity ever-de­
flected from complete reflection into unconscious and 
preconscious production--a fully transparent philosophi­
cal moment of self-reflection is not possible. The 
philosophy of art, then, stands as a philosophical 
epilogue to the System of Transcendental Idealism and the 
first announcement of Schelling's own system of absolute 
philosophy, the System of Identity. 
The System is a rich and intricate work, and we 
certainly do not exhaust its significance in mentioning 
the pivotal place it occupies in speculative idealism's 
march from Fichte to Hegel, nor even in pointing to the 
place it holds within Schelling's own philosophical 
development. Written at the turn of the century, it 
belongs to two different epochs. Its origin lies in the 
classic calm of the philosophy of consciousness which 
dominated European thought from Descartes through Kant; 
its impulse is toward the uneasy philosophies of will 
which were to dominate the nineteenth century and which 
define man, not in terms of the infinite reach of the 
concept timelessly attai ned in theoria, but in terms of 
a dialectic of striving, need and finite fulfilment. 
Let us look to some of the central philosophical themes 
that the System raises, problems and positions that the 
20th Century reader can still appreciate despite the 
oddness of, and the general philosophical antipathy 
towards, the outlook of speculative idealism. 
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The Primacy of the Practical 
Like Fichte, his predecessor and exemplar, Schel­
ling s .ets out to render the Kantian philosophy clear and 
cogent. Read with an eye turned back to the Kantian 
sources, the System seems a compendium of the three 
Critiques, an attempt to organize Kant's wayward and 
varying assessments of reason's function in intramundane 
experience, in moral judgment and in aesthetic/teleologi­
cal harmonizations of experience, and to gather them 
under one transcendental deduction.6 Like other readers 
a.nd interpreters of Kant, Schelling is at times overwhelmed 
by the material he is trying to control and seems not so 
much to systematize Kant as to be setting didactic exposi­
tions of the mechanisms of Kant's understanding alongside 
his own dialectical treatment of consciousness. In other 
places he is a more successful interpreter: Difficult as 
it is, the deduction of presentation as a reality-pro­
ducing intuition {Part III, pp. 51-93) clarifies the 
mysterious "merely given" character of the Kantian sen­
sible manifold. And in his insistence upon the central 
role of time in consciousness, upon its being in fact the 
basic character of that synthesis 0f the finite and the 
infinite which is the self, Schelling rescues Kant's 
schematisrn from~ts obscure hiding place in the text of 
the First Critique and gives it its proper prominence. 
To someone philosophizing after Kant it could appear 
that, over and above the critical results of the examina­
tion of reason, and despite all the cautionary notes, a 
positive Kantian philosophy was indeed possible. Kant 
had left a legacy of positive doctrine pointing in the 
direction of a systematic development--for instance, the 
ideal of a systematic form for all philosophy and of 
philosophy's function"as a metascience, developed in the 
Critique's "Architectonic"; the revolutionary notion of 
transcendental questioning as a methodology; and, in 
texts drawn from theoretical as well as practical philo­
sophy, a fully positive description of pure reason, 
operating in and for itself, as a function of self­
relation. 
Following out these hints of Kant, Fichte took the 
decisive step toward a speculative criticism in his 
apprehension that cognition and action are fundamentally 
the same, that an identity, or better, a striving for 
identity is the ground and motivation of reason both in 
cognition and action. Reason strives for self-coincidence. 
60n the relation of Fichtean idealism to Kant's texts and 
to a possible system of Kantianism drawn from them, see "Second 
Introduction to the Science of Knowledge," .92.. cit., pp. 42-62. 
See also Schelling, "On the Possibility of a Form of All Philo­
sophy," tr. F. Marti, Metaphilosophy, VI, l (1975). 
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The unification of sensible experience into a world, and 
the further (but for Kant, illicit) unification of 
experiential concepts into ideas, are but special cases 
of reason's functioning, which is more basically exempli­
fied in practical reason's struggle to establish and main­
tain autonomy against heteronomy, independence against 
external determination, Reason is self-relation and 
seeks to maintain identity in the face of otherness--
this is Fichte's great insight: He concludes his guest 
to define and clarify the objectivity of the mysterious 
not-self by saying, 
The self, as such, is initially in a state of 
reciprocity with itself, and only so does an 
external influence upon it become possible,7 
And again, 
The ultimate ground of all consciousness is an 
interaction of the self with itself, by way of a 
not-self that has to be regarded from different 
points of view.a 
Reason as act seeks to find and establish itself in the 
other. This is the heart of the Science of Knowledge and 
it is this insight which for Fichte, Schelling and Hegel 
determines the primacy of the practical over the theore­
tical, the priority of spirit over nature. It is this 
primacy of the practical, the vision that reason is active 
rather than passive, that turns transcendental idealism 
decisively away from the kind of epistemological and 
ontological preoccupations exhibited by even the Kantian 
philosophy and toward moral, social and political philo­
sophy, and the philosophy of history, The issue every­
where is freedom, the relative self-sufficiency of a 
finite spirit, rooted firmly in worldly being. The post­
Kantian idealists are not concerned to dispute spirit's 
anchoring in an objective natural and social world, but 
they want to see it interpreted in terms of the suf­
ficiency and the life of spirit. They want to view worldly 
being and its objectivity, not as an absolute and estab­
lished plenum of being, but as a totality relative to 
consciousness, as acquiring meaning only in terms of 
that relation. It is not mute being but meaning that 
is the standard, and not a meaning rooted in brute being 
and finding arbitrary expression in language, but a 
meaning that stems from activity, from that peculiar 
activity of self-consciousness where act and awareness 
fully coincide. Thus in Fichte's eyes, and for the 
tradition after him, cognition as clarified and explained 
by theoretical philosophy is a limited and unsatisfactory 
form of self-activity because it is always an activity 
7 The Science of Knowledge, p . 244. 
8rbid,, p. 248. 
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related to an other--until, that is, it is brought by 
philosophy to that state wherein it becomes fully self­
directed and self-conscious, in will or activity proper. 
Both within the System and over the course of his 
long speculative career, Schelling is basically in accord 
with Fichte in granting priority to praxis rather than to 
theory.9 The philosophical system, he insists, is itself 
an act of freedom. It is not a vision of reality passively 
received, impressed from without, rather it is a free 
recapitulation of the act of selfhood, the primordial 
synthesis (p. 49). Tne philosophical system is primarily 
about selfhood and its conditions, and has the basic 
character of an act. There is no question, then, of 
catching things as they are, of probing the being of things 
or of doing any sort of ontology: "Being, in our system, 
is merely freedom suspended" (p. 33). Even the self, the 
principle of system itself, is not a thing but a postulate; 
it is not a piece of objectivity lying ready-to-hand, but 
something that must be enacted. "What the self is, is for 
that reason no more demonstrable than what the line is; one 
can only describe the action whereby it comes about" (p. 
29) • 
An idealistic philosophy, so Schelling maintains, can 
have only a practical basis; it is grounded in the free 
act of spirit taking itself as central. As such, an 
idealistic system is, strictly speaking, without any 
purely theoretical basis; it can call upon no primary 
datum and educe no proof other than its own free activity. 
It must in fact attempt to reduce or re-interpret the whole 
theoretical standpoint in light of free activity: Ultimacy 
is not to be accorded to the presentation, or to the presen­
tation•s objective factor (Kant's sensible manifold), or 
even to some final ground of givenness (Kant's thing-in­
itself). The System, accordingly, undertakes to explain 
givenness itself as an interplay of conscious and uncon­
scious activities; it reads the obviously non-conscious 
activity of mechanical and organic nature as equivalent 
to willing and action (p. 12) . To avoid ceding ultimacy 
to objectivity, it has recourse to a pre-established harmony 
of sorts, which links free activity and non-conscious pro­
duction without engulfing the one factor in the other 
(p. 129). So that spirit shall not be lost in a world of 
matter and motion, nature is itself spiritualized. Ul­
timately the standpoint of cognition itself is abolished, 
its distinctness negated: "What is commonly called 
theoretical reason is nothing else but imagination in the 
9 The one notable departure from his lifelong allegiance to the 
practical and spirit-centered orientation of the Fichtean outlook is 
the System of Identity of 1801-1806 which is prefigured in the System's 
concluding sections on history and art. It seeks a model of being not 
in man's activity but in a quantified and formalistic approach to 
physical being. 
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service of freedom" (p. 176). 
In the light of the tenuous nature of Schelling's 
allegiance to Fichteanism at the System's writing, one 
might be critical of all this emphasis on freedom. He 
had, after all , been struggling to articulate a philosophy 
of nature within idealism and had not met with Fichte's 
approval . Then, too, the System contains many hints of 
the transition to the realistic metaphysics of the System 
of Identity, a system patently modelled after Spinoza. 
Nonetheless, the emphasis upon freedom is genuine, not 
merely a formal repetition of the Science of Knowledge. 
From his ea.rliest writings, Schelling was moved by t e 
spirit of Kantian freedom to criticize and methodologically 
to delimit what then appeared the only consistent meta­
physics, Spinozism. (The center of the critical tradition 
always appeared to be its defense of freedom.) Even in 
the System of Identity, inaugurated by a work which adopts 
not only the deductive form of Spinoza's Ethics but a good 
deal ob its naturalistic and deterministic spirit as 
well,l freedom is still of capital importance for Schelling: 
The existence of quantifiable conceptual shapes (ideas) as 
sensible particulars is described as a 'fall' from the 
Absolute, an exercise of 'self-will,' a free act.11 Being, 
at least in its particular and existential aspects, if not 
in its eidetic character, is still conceived as activity 
and life. 
In the 1809 Philosophical Investigations of the Nature 
of Human Freedom Schelling clearly returned to the pragmatic 
or spirit-centered standpoint of the System. He now inter­
prets all being, in its objective aspects as well as its 
subjective ones, through categories of willing. He out­
lines the construction of a total system of philosophy, 
ranging from a theory of nature to a philosophy of history, 
upon the complex interplay of dependence and independence 
in human freedom and upon the moral, social and historical 
decisiveness of action. "Primordial being is will, 11 main­
tains Schelling,12 and, in a deliberately anthropomorphic 
move, he :i,dentifies this primal will with the human exer­
cise of will. Resorting to the theosophical myth of the 
Creation's inherence in a cosmic Adam, Schelling para­
doxically makes being's articulation in cosmogony, its 
stabilization in nature, and its eventual fulfilment in 
history the consequences of the emergence of finite spirit. 
All being bears the stamp of the decisiveness first 
lOThe Presentation of My Own System, 1801. 
llsee the dialogue~ (1802) and Philosophy and Religion 
(1804). 
12Heidegger has called this statement the turning point in 
modern metaphysics. See What Is Called Thinking? tr. Wieck and Gray 
(Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 90-91. See also Schellings Abhandlung iiber 
das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (Tilbingen, 1971), pp. 114-20. 
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attained by human freedom in the creati on of value, in the 
fashioning of good and evil. A comment in the System 
evokes the kernel of the 1809 essay, where Schelling 
suggests that the complex finitude of human consciousness-­
involving a possible predetermination of the freely deter­
mined, the limitation of freedom due to individuality, and 
the influence of other intellects--is thinkable only in 
terms of an original act of freedom, an act originative of 
ontological as well as moral definiteness, determinative 
of character as well as individuality.13 
Nor was Schelling's interest in the sovereignty of 
freedom exhausted in the 1809 essay. All of his later 
work, from the 1815 Ages of the World to the lectures on 
mythology and religion of the 1840s and '50s, show 
Schelling in search of a principle of freedom and actuality 
not confined to and determined by reality as merely con­
ceived. Freedom must be more than the activity postulated 
by philosophical thought behind the world as presented and 
experienced. It must be more than a concept in the domain 
of the possible, more than the result of thought dia­
lectically playing through all the possible. It must be 
the origin, the principle of existence and actuality. 
Freedom is the place where thought (as an interplay of con­
cepts) leaves off and reality begins. The complete system 
of philosophy, as conceived by the late Schelling, faces 
a double task--starting from the conceptual, to attain to 
freedom and, within thought, to give birth to the actual 
and living subject; then, from the side of existence, to 
trace its course empirically through history. 
In all the phases of his long career, freedom is one 
of Schelling's crucial and operative concepts. It is 
prior to all categories, beyond the play of the possible 
which is the proper concern of metaphysics or theoretical 
philosophy--the one reality beyond concepts, beyond naming, 
the touchstone by which to judge the rest of the vision 
of the universe that a philosophy projects. We know it, 
as. Fichte said, because we are it, we do it,14 The actual 
takes precedence over the possible, the practical over the 
theoretical--not from any conceptual reason or ground, but 
from our ~xistence as spirit. 
System and Facticity 
The System of Transcendental Idealism is above all a 
system, an ordering will toward a comprehensive knowledge. 
Its single goal, says Schelling, is to discover a system 
in human knowledge, to determine the princ iple whereby all 
individual knowing is determined (p. 18). 
Now it was Kant who first brought to light the 
systematic character of reason and, within the very 
13 Seep. 193 below. 
1411First Introduction to the Science of Knowledge," section l; 
.. Second Introduction," sections 3 and 4, ~- ~-
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discussion of the generally misleading character of reason 
as a faculty of ideas, underlined its legitimacy. In 
addition to its function of unify_ing experiential concepts 
into pure concepts or ideas, reason pursues an "ideal:" 
It elaborates a complete system of all possible predicates, 
arranged in antithetical pairs, and attempts the complete 
determination of any being which is its object by assigning 
one member of every pair to it.15 Every concrete predica­
tion logically presumes this total field of predicates; 
conversely the system of predicates presumes the complete 
determinacy of every object. Now Kant thinks such a 
systematic elaboration of transcendental logic both a 
necessary and a valid procedure. Reason can err only in 
hypostatizing this ideal, in using it to form the idea of 
an -absolutely determined object which embraces the whole 
f ·ield of predicates, that is to say, God. Later in the 
FirS't Critique Kant revises his estimate of the legitimacy 
of the notion of system. Rather than perceiving it as 
proceeding to an unwarranted hypostatization in the idea 
of an absolute object, he sees it as the defining and 
guiding ideal of philosophy. Under this ideal philosophy 
seeks to combine all systems of knowledge, i.e., all 
sciences, into one "system of human thought."16 
Fichte and Schelling indeed set out to regularize 
and systematize the Kantian philosophy, not merely in the 
sense of bringing the multiplicity of texts (and of 
philosophical perspectives too) to some unity, but in the 
sense of pursuing this ideal of reaso.n. Reason--the self 
as autonomous in the practical sphere, if not in the 
cognitive--must see itself reflected in the totality of 
worldly being, must grasp the sum of its self-determinations 
as the comprehensive specification of the natural and 
i'htersubjective worlds' objectivity. It is this total 
reflexivity of reason that Fichte stipulates as the heart 
of transcendental idealism: 
So what then, in a couple of words, is the import 
of the Science of Knowledge? It is this: reason 
is absolutely independent; it exists only for it­
self; but for it, too, it is all that exists. So 
that everything that it is must be founded in 
itse.lf and explained solely from itself, and 
not from anything outside it .••• 17 
Reason is in essence systematic, an ordering and patterning 
will to know, a will to discover itsel,f in the known.18 
15
critique of Pure Reason, A568-583, B596-6ll. 
16Critique of Pure Reason, A832-B39, BB60-867. 
17"Second Introduction to the Science of Knowledge," ~- £!!·, 
p. 48. 
l8see Martin Hei,degger, Schellings Abhandlung iiber das Wesen 
der menschlichen Freiheit,~- cit., pp. 31-41. 
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Schelling initiated his reflections on the possibility 
of a system of philosophy in his first philosophical essay, 
written in 1794. Looking into the Kantian notion of 
system, he sees that system means not only the reduction of 
a multiplicity to a unity- -as in Kant ' s categories of the 
understanding, which are all specifications of the one 
primary concept, relation--but implies a reciprocity of 
form and content as well, A system is an organism, as it 
were, in which content and form, subject-matter and method­
ology, cannot be arbitrarily isolated, but reflect into 
one another. This organic reciprocity is the hallmark of 
scientific form. 
The notion of system becomes doubly important in the 
System of Transcendental Idealism, for the work, uncon­
sciously documenting Schelling's move from Fichtean idealism 
to the "ideal-realism" of the Identity System, has two dis­
tinct senses of system in play: (1) The obvious one, 
inherited from Fichte, of an immanent unification of human 
knowledge under its principle or guiding process, viz., 
reflexive self-relation; but (2) system also in the sense 
of a comprehensive science, a total philosophy comprehending 
all the different possible perspectives upon reality. 
System in the second sense comprehends and includes the 
first, which, limited as it is to the immanent standpoint, · 
is only one portion of the total account. This latter (at 
least as described, problematically and ' progranunatically, 
in the System) parallels the transcendental system with a 
co-equal system of natural science , a philosophy of nature, 
and contemplates joining the two through a transcendental 
logic, a metaphysical theory of identity and difference;l9 
This duality in working notions of system riddles the 
whole work and introduces a degree of internal inconsistency . 
Despite its massiveness and its detail, the stem counts s1as a transitional work in Schelling's own phi osophical 
development, an entr'acte between the Philosophy of Nature 
of 1797-1799 and the Identity System of 1801 and thereafter. 
The Foreword and Introduction of the System essentially 
look back to the philosophy of nature . They point out 
the necessary but complementary opposition between nature­
philosophy and transcendental idealism, and suggest that 
philosophy can complete its one task, the exhibition of 
the work of absolute consciousness, only in a double 
manner--in paralleling a realism to · an idealism, and 
demonstrating their identical principle. The system-prin­
ciple these sections suggest seems to be the polar nature 
of absolute consciousness, which attains actualization in 
separate real and ideal orders, and thus makes nature and 
spirit equally primary. They operate, in short, within 
19The System recognizes and allows only an intuitive approach 
to this transcendental logic of identity/ difference, namely through 
the philosophy of art. 
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the second and broader of the definitions of system dis­
tinguished above. 
The body of the System, comprising the general remarks 
on transcendental philosophy and the theoretical and 
practical deductions , is solely a system of transcendental 
idealism. "My only concern," says Schelling, "is to bring 
system into my knowledge itself and to seek within know­
ledge itself for that by which all individual knowing is 
determined" (p. 18). Here the system-principle is "a 
universal mediating factor in our knowledge" (p. 15), a 
reconciliation of identical (or analytic) and synthetic 
modes of thinking (pp. 22-24)--intellectual intuition. 
In this context intellectual intuition is not the immediate 
intuition. In this context intellectual intuition is not 
the immediate ascent to the Absolute which it will be in 
the Identity-System, the· holistic grasp of the totality. 
Here in the System, intellectual intuition is the mode of 
being of the self, of the totality of the known and knowing; 
the self is said to be intellectual intuition subsistent 
(pp. 27-28). But precisely as an intuition, this intel­
lectual intuition is insufficiently self-reflexive to be 
both immediate and total, and thus is from the first, and 
irrevocably so, sundered into unconscious production and 
conscious intuition. It seems a paradoxical play of words 
(and perhaps Schelling's language here is careless and 
uncommunicative), 6ut intellectual intuition is an uncon­
scious principle of consciousness; our awareness is always 
an intuition directed back upon a production, i.e. upon a 
production-intuition, an activity become objectified. In 
the transcendental system proper, up to the point in the 
history of consciousness whe re practical philosophy dis­
solves into the action of history, no totalization of 
intuition is possible. Intellectual intuition cannot be 
realized except as process, as the ongoing flux of our 
experiencings. Transcendental philosophy cannot ascend 
to the Absolute Identity as such. The absolute synthesis, 
the reconciliation of freedom and necessity, lies outside 
its domain: Schelling can mention it at the conclusion of 
the practical philosophy only as a regulative idea, in 
the strict Kantian sense of the term. For transcendental 
idealism at least, "the opposition between conscious and 
unconscious activity is necessarily an unending one" 
(p. 210). As in Fichte's Science of Knowled1e, an absolute consciousness, a totalization of intellectua intuition, is 
postulated as an origin and princlple of system, but is 
unreachable as a result. Fichte himself explained the 
incongruity of principle and of result, the abiding 
difference between pure self -positing and lived synthesis, 
in this fashion. 
The form of the system is based on the highest 
synthesis {of self and not-self, of conscious 
and unconscious activity]; that there should be 
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a system at all, on the absolute thesis [the 
self-positing of the self, intellectual intui­
tion} .20 
The system of transcendental idealism is a system of the 
forms of empirical consciousness, whose principle or 
transcendental ground of_ explanation is an absolute con­
sciousness. The latter simply cannot appear as an item 
within the system: it stands behind it as a postulate. 
Given Schelling's basic agreement, at least in the 
body of the System, that absolute consciousness is 
ineffable, it is odd, and for his future development , 
quite significant, that the work in conclusion moves 
beyond the dialectic of empirical consciousness. At 
this point Schelling advances a metaphysical appendix 
patterned on Kant's Criti!ue of Judgment. Teleological 
interpretations of natura phenomena and aesthetic intui­
tion are seen t o be immediate and non-discursive approaches 
to that Absolute Identity which is the ineffable origin and 
unreachable goal of transcendental philosophy properly so 
called (viz., the system of human knowing). Schelling 
cautiously suggests that philosophy as a systematic totality 
and a metascience can be completed, with a philosophy of 
art serving as an approach to a pure identity-theory. For 
art, as Schelling sees it, is a symbolic and necessarily 
asymptotic approach to the Identity underlying all con­
sciousness. The work of art is a concrete intuition of 
identity-in-difference, of multiple and inexhaustible 
meanings packed into one meaning; thus it accomplishes 
symbolically what philosophy attempts to do discursively-­
present the totality, exhibit the Absolute. Art thus 
becomes the sole concrete analogue of intellect ual intui­
tion, the one place wbere producing and intuiting fully 
coincide. In this appendix, then, Schelling returns to 
tbe second and broader of the definitions of system we 
distinguished. He makes obvious too his abandonment of 
the Fichtean principle that there is no absolute con­
sciousness outside of empirical consciousness and vice 
versa,21 and in so doing displays a drift toward an 
absolute and objective system of philosophy, a system 
again embracing ontology and overstepping the critical­
transcendental cautions which would confine philosophy to 
a. phenomenology of consciousness . 
It is the destiny of Schelling's whole sixty year 
long career in philosophy, and in a certain sense its 
ruin, to again and again confront this ideal of a systema­
tic and properly scientific philosophy, to put it under 
critical scrutiny, but ultimately to set it aside and 
reluctantly affirm the factual and discrete character of 
20
science of Knowledge, p. 114. 
21 See The Science of Knowledge, pp. 108-9, 118. 
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reality, its irreducible particularity and dispersion. 
Nietzsche once suggested that it is characteristic of 
modernity that a thinker cannot write the work, but must 
undertake an authorship and embrace in perspective and 
in series that which defies total and direct statement. 
It is the tension between the leading concepts of system 
and facticity which inhabits all Schelling's thought and 
which makes him such a 'modern,' and from the reader's 
point of view, protean and unsettled thinker. 
As Schelling begins consciously to approach the 
standpoint of an absolute system of reason here in the 
System of Transcendental Idealism, we see the problem of 
the equivocal nature of the isolated individual entity 
prise as well: If everything is most truly in reason (or 
in the Absolute), how does it exist outside the totality 
of reason? And whence comes the extra-systematic intel­
ligibility of the particular given in sensory experience? 
In 1795 the young follower of Fichte had said that 
there can be no leap from the absolute and systematic 
perspective to that of the individual existent, no deduc­
tion of the finite (S.W. I, 314).22 And yet he sensed 
that the whole pointcir systematic philosophy is to sub­
due and, as it were, domesticate the otherness that 
individuals exhibit in their contingent and mutually 
external existence. Fichte before him had pointed out 
that philosophy's business is to conceptualize otherness 
and bring it within the ambit of the self, but the Science 
of Knowledge is ample proof of the elusive and dialectical 
character of the undertaking. There Fichte is forced to 
admit that the whole project seems contradictory, almost 
unthinkable: 
Hence if ever a difference was to enter the self 
there must already have been a difference 
originally in the self as, such; and this differ­
ence, indeed, would have had to be grounded in 
the absolute self as such.23 
In the System we can already detect Schelling's pre­
occupation with the factual and discrete character of 
particulars and see the beginnings of his tortuous, some­
times labored attempts to respect the factual in its 
uncanny and pertinacious resistance to reason , and, at 
the same time, to reduce the irreducibly singular to the 
formula, and, so quantified, to include it within the 
structured totality that reason articulates. The dialec­
tical, perhaps antithetical, purposes motivating Schel­
ling's vision of systematic philosophy become more sharply 
outlined in the Identity-System, particularly after 1804. 
0 
' 22 Even in · the Ident i ty-System he maintains · · th a t posi · t ion, maki ng 
the finite particular an ultimate surd . Cf. s.w., VI, 38. 
232£_. cit. , p. 240. --
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The predominant tone of the S*stem,hawever, is a differ­
ential respect for the indivi ual, a prizing of the con­
crete over the general, a cautious realism. Many times 
over in the course of the deductions, Schelling gives 
prominence to a real factor over an ideal one, adopts 
idealism solely as a me~hodological stance and prefers an 
idealistically motivated realism which preserves the 
phenomena in all their complexity over any metaphysical 
idealism which would reduce and simplify the richness of 
experience. For example, in the theoretical philosophy 
he stresses the second limitation of the self, individuality, 
and its experiential correlate, time, over the more general 
limitation to intuiting intelligence and objectivity (pp. 
116-17). Further he maintains that everything is at once 
a priori and a posteriori; the distinction holds only 
within philosophic reflection, and so all our knowledge 
is empirical through and through (pp. 151-53). In the 
practical philosophy he emphasizes that selfhood can be 
raised to consciousness only as individual selfhood or 
will; thus the crucial limitation of the self is not its 
restriction to intelligence, but the third and individuating 
limitation which poses the will as specified prior to its 
willing, and posits the self as opposed to and determined 
by the willing of other selves (pp. 165-69). It is in this 
third restrictedness, individuation, that the theoretical 
and practical philosophies find themselves united. For 
consciousness, in its full concreteness, becomes possible 
only in simultaneously confronting a definite objective 
world and interacting with other selves: "Only by the 
fact that there are intelligences outside me [and thus 
that I am individual] does the world as such become 
objective to me" (p. 173). From this focal point the 
rest of the system's meditations on the paradoxes of the 
concrete existence of spirit unfold, viz., that choice, 
conditioned by natural inclination, is the only appearance 
of freedom (p. 190); that history evidences the free 
performance of an unconscious and involuntary necessity 
{pp. 203 f .); that the Absolute itself, or Identity, 
must be considered equally as free and as necessitated, 
e qually as conscious activity and as unconscious (pp . 
208-12) . Schelling the idealist shows himself every­
where prepared to turn away from consciousness seeking 
to grasp itself in the full transparency of thought, and 
to recognize and respect instead the hard, resisting, 
opaque and experientially locating features of reality. 
The strange result: The idealist is forced to accord 
primacy to the unconsc1ous. 
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The Dominance of the Unconscious 
The moment really characteristic of Schelling's 
philosophizing in the S~stem of Transcendental Idealism, 
the moment most in continuity with the rest of his thought, 
is his insistence upon the unconscious. The principle of 
system is self-consciousness--or perhaps we might better 
say, setting aside the contemporary connotation of 
reflexive self-awareness, self-activitf. The self qua 
system-principle, and not as the delimited focus of 
empirical consciousness, is originally mere activity 
(p. 36). It is infinitely non-objective, non-thing-like, 
for all things are thoroughly conditioned, while the 
system-principle (reason demands) is to be unconditioned. 
The self is thus pure inwardness (p. 26), a process and 
-only derivatively a being or a state of a being. It is a 
continuing self-enactment which, while indeed it comes to 
light in self-awareness, is not at all circumscribed by 
it. It is a performance not exhausted in intuition, a ( 
continual energizing. The self--or, equivalently, self- , 
consciousness--is essentially self-constituting. Schelling \ 
names this self-enactment intellectual intuition. 
Intellectual intuition turns out to be a paradoxical 
concept. It is not properly a cognitive state and thus 
bears no similarity to any intuition given in empirical 
consciousness. It is not merely an activity of, or a 
faculty in, the subject; it is the subject. The self 
is intellectual intuition suosistent; it exists by knowing 
~f in this -non-objective manner (p. 28) . This 
'special knowing,' therefore, is more than a mere knowing. 
It is, as Kant first defined the term,24 an archetypal 
knowing, a knowing which constitutes as well as cognizes. 
Now an infinite self or a God would transparently 'know' 
in this manner, but the self which is the principle of the 
system of human consciousness is (as Fichte had insisted 
from the first) an absolute consciousness inside human 
consciousness, and thus finite. Finitude means that 
intellectual intuition is not . unitary, immediate and fully 
self-reflected, that self-consciousness is not pure self­
awareness. The philosopher in his imitation of intellectual 
intuition discovers a fragmented consciousness which can 
be gathered back int'o itsel f only through mediation-­
through experience, reflection, and finally systematic 
philosophy or its surrogate, aesthetic intuition. 
~ The 'special knowing,' then, which constitutes our 
consciousness is at one and the same time a sundering of 
the selt's activity into productive and intuitive facets 
or capacities, the maintenance 'of this division as, in 
24 
see "On the Form of the Sensible and Intelligible Worlds 
and Their Principles" (1770), paragraph 10. 
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principle, a polar opposition, and finally, within time, 
a stepwise relativization of that oppositi on in the~ies 
of presentations. The self's being (or knowing, or activ­
ity) is the coming-to-be of a world for it . Self-con­
sciousness is thus (1) a steady, enduring juxtaposition of 
conscious (intuiting) a.ctivities and unconscious (pro­
ducing) ones, of activities constitutive of subjective 
awareness and worldly objectivity respectively; and (2) an 
ongoing translation from unconscious over to conscious and 
properly intuiting activity. Since this self-constituting 
and self-bifurcating self which is the postulate behind the 
system (pp. 28, 33) does not and cannot appear in empirical 
consciousness, and since it enacts itself as production 
. prior to and beyond the reach of cognitive awareness, it 
is largely, in fact dominantly, unconscious. 
Fichte, of course, set the terms of this comparison 
in the Science of Knowledge·, but he preferred not to 
stress, as Schelling does, the absolute contrast between 
activity (almost by definition unconscious) and awareness; 
instead he sought to interpose terms connoting both affect 
and effect between the two--terms like strivin~ and feeling-­
and thus to effect their mediation. In grounding self-con­
sciousness in an opaque activity which is 'inward' only 
when internally directed and which, when directed outward, 
only realizes or produces but does not illuminate, 
Schelling abandons the old Cartesian ideal of consciousness 
as complete ~elf-transparency. Fichte had made the same 
moves, to be sure, but he was reluctant to embrace to the 
full the consequences of his introduction of finitude into 
the basic model of consciousness. He transposed the 
absolute identity of the first ground-principle, excluded 
from realization in empirical consciousness by the myster­
ious persistence of the not-self, into a moral ideal. In 
his hands, the failure of the "is" becomes the justifica­
tion of the "ought. 11 25 
Things are quite different with Schelling. There is 
a frank recognition of the in principle unconscious nature 
of the activity of self-constitution . It is significant 
that the ultimate ascent to the Absolute which Schelling 
proposes in the System is neither cognitive nor moral but 
aesthetic, that it is not an eidetic intuition of some 
sort, nor an intimation of transcendent value, but a 
symbolic and ~reduced totality of subjective and objective 
elements resi ing in the unconsciously produced work of 
art, which fully reveals the nature of self-consciousness. 
"[Art] ever and again continues to speak to us of what 
philosophy cannot depict in external form, namely the 
unconscious element in acting and producing, and its 
original identity with the conscious" (p . 231). Art, 
25Th Science · o f Kn l d 229 - 30 • e owe ge, pp. 
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thinks Schelling, divines the unconscious and active force 
.behind things and so has priority as~ philosophical 
instrument over both empirical consciousness and theore­
tical-reflective activity. The idealist of 1799 who 
speaks in terms of self-consciousness is really not far 
from the chthonic and irrationalist philosopher of 1809 
who was to say, 
In the final and highest instance there is no 
other being than Will. Will is primordial 
Being, and all predicates .apply to it alone-­
groundlessness, eternity, independence of time, 
self-affirmation. All philosophy strives only 
to find this highest expression.26 
In the S stem of Transcendental Idealism the uncon­
scious functions as a kin o a so ute principle. It is 
the opaque knot of actuality in the self, the productive 
or realizing intuition which opposes the limitant activity 
(which is the self's} to its properly intuitive activity 
of cognition and keeps them thus tied together. But this 
productive element remains hidden, unconscious, and its 
workings remain forever enigmatic (pp. 78-9). Idealism, 
thinks Schelling, is forced to admit such an unconscious 
production and actualization in spite of its allegiance 
to self-consciousness. For it can in no wise explain the 
distinction. of inner and outer activity, i.e., of the 
experiential self and the experienced 'thing,' except by 
a nalogy to a kind of actualizing intelligence which loses 
itself (and self-awareness) in its productions, just as 
the inspired artist loses himself in his work (pp. 74-5). 
In unconscious producing, real and ideal (i.e., object­
constituting and object-intuiting) activities are somewhow 
one; when the cpgnizing self arrives at awareness of the 
product, they will be differentiated, but are as yet 
unseparated. Explanation must stop at this point, for 
philosophy can only postulate this unconscious producing-­
the idealistic counterpart of the Kantian ultimate ground 
of appearance, the thing-in-i~self--but cannot elucidate 
it. It cannot at all illuminate what it must postulate 
as the basic fact of consciousness, "the infinite tendency 
of the self tobecome an object for itself," i.e., to 
bound its own activity and subsequently to intuit its 
boundedness as objective, existing and external to itself. 
"It is not the fact that I am determinately limited which 
cannot be explained, but themanner of this limitation 
itself" (p. 59). The manner of this limitation--the 
concretizing of the self's activity as objectivity which 
productive intuition effects--is as paradoxical and 
inexplicable as the self itself: an identity which is 
260£ Human Freedom, tr. J. Gutmann (Chicago, 1936), p. 241 
!!!•, VII, 350. 
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not an identity but a synthesis; a synthesis which is not 
one synthesis but many syntheses packed into one; not a 
timeless and immediate resolution of the infinite conflicts 
of its opposed modes of activity, but an indefinitely ex­
tended and ongoing partial solution (pp. 45-6, SO). The 
self, which produces on~y in order to come to self-iden­
tity out of antithetical opposition, can nonetheless pro­
duce only as conditioned by this conflict (pp. 113-14). 
Like the mysterious and dark Indifference of the Identity­
System (an absolute identity somehow 'already' differen­
tiated) the self-consciousness which is the principle and 
subject of the system has a paradoxical and dark side, 
a hidden ground which is in fact its antitype. At the 
basis of self-consciousness itself is a knot of pure fact, 
quite hidden from reason, viz., its origin in and ultimate 
dependence upon unconscious activity. 
It is this centrality of productive, activity, and 
its irreducibly unconscious character, that most illu­
minates the fatalism which lies at the heart of Schelling's 
practical philosophy. Transcendental Idealism is a philo­
sophy of praxis wherein activity everywhere predominates 
over being (or previously determined activity). Yet 
within the system, Schelling curiously avows, the philo­
sophy of action can only show itself objectively; praxis 
can appear only as history, as an objective order of 
world-events, shaped and guided, perhaps, by some teleo­
logical impulse toward a universal world-order (p. 4). 
The subjective and personal aspect of praxis cannot appear; 
the consciously guided aspect of an individual's activity, 
the element of personal freed~,, cannot appear as act, but 
only obliquely, as phst deed. The sole efficacious 
element in action, t e sole objectivity, is an intuiting, 
and the intuiting appears not as act, but as an intuited, 
an objective something. The causality of my will, so 
Schelling maintains, is consumed and exhausted in the 
construction/intuition of an objective world; there is no 
possibility of this world's alteration. "We act freely 
and the world comes to exist independently of us" (p. 
182). There is no sense of freedom other than that self­
determination whereby I know (and determine the existence 
of) a world: there is no efficacious altering of reality 
other than my bringing it forth as a series of presentations 
and cognizing it. The self, which is will and act, is 
nothing other than an act of knowin<J: "The self exists 
only in that it appears to""Ttself; its knowing is a form 
of being" (p. 185). More than that, knowing is its only 
conscious form of being; its originative (and central) 
activity can be intuited only as past, as the objectivity 
of a thoroughly determined world. On the level of 
27 
see the lengthy discussion pp. 177-88 below. 
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conscious awareness, there is such a thorough-going iden­
tity of acting and intuiting that freedom itself is mani­
fested only as a natural phenomenon. Absolute freedom 
appears objectively only as natural inclination (p. 186). 
This is a thoroughly deterministic reading of the human 
situation of action, one which excludes the notion of a 
personal and voluntary participation in a moral order. 
The System's analysis of the ethical situation explains 
all ethics away, inasmuch as it makes the moral law a 
subjective necessity (the purely personal ideal of total 
self-determination) posed over and against the objective 
necessity of inclination. The only place, consequently, 
where practical activity can appear as action rather than 
as response to determination is in the arbitrary choice, 
whi~h is said to reconcile the conflicting subjective and 
objective demands (p. 190). There is none of the Kantian 
exaltation of the moral sphere here, despite the Kantian 
language the analysis employs. Schelling's intent is to 
move beyond the ethical, toward the global and objective 
order of the self's action in history. Only insofar as 
the active self or will appears, only insofar as it per­
tains to the world of phenomena, as it is conditioned in 
and by empirical consciousness, can it be said to be free: 
"the will itself transcends freedom" (p. 191). 
An analysis of history similarly deterministic-­
wherein events are patterned by the ·emergence of a drive 
toward world polity, a drive which in part stems from 
human cooperation but is in part impelled and necessi­
tated by a h~gher providential source--moves Schelling 
to adopt the notion of a hidden Absolute, an Identity 
behind all conscious exercise of will which is the 
reconciliation of the highest paradox, the apparent 
opposition of freedom and lawfulness. The contradictions 
between freedom and determinism, between the self as 
intelligence and the self as will, cannot be solved on 
the conscious level; an ultimate synthesis is called for, 
beyond all consciousness: 
sucna pre-established harmony of the objective 
(or law-governed) and the determinant (or free) 
is conceivable only through some higher thing, 
set over them both, and which is therefore neither 
intelligence nor free, but rather is the common 
source of the intelligent and likewise of the free. 
(P. 208) 
Ultimately consciousness is put to one side and made 
~ynonymous with appearance, while the hidden Absolute is 
identified with the irreducibly unconscious element in s~lf­
consciousness and with the essential and indissoluble 
tension between the conscious and the unconscious. The 
unconscious as determinant activity becomes the ground of 
consciousness and of freedom, a ground never wholly to be 
clarified and translated into the light of consciousness. 
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A thorough-going determinism pervades the whole .realm of 
consciousness and freedom becomes mere appearance.28 
The opposition between conscious and unconscious 
activity is necessarily an unending one, for were it 
ever to be done away with, the appearance of freedom, 
which rests entirely upon it, would be done away 
with too . ( P • 21 0 ) 
Radical Finitude, Time and History 
In the name of freedom or activity as such, freedom 
of act is abrogated; on the principle of self-conscious­
ness, individual consciousness is reduced to unconscious 
activity--the System either veers into inconsistency and 
paradox of an amateurish sort, or, more probably, points 
to an essential paradox deep inthe heart of its subject­
matter, human consciousness. Fichte had grappled with the 
same paradox in a schematic fashion and concluded that it 
is at very least odd for consciousness to be sovereignly 
independent and yetfinite. Schelling, we suggest, under­
takes a more detailed analysis of the finitude of conscious­
ness, and, child of the Enlightenment though he is, comes 
closer to voicing the radically finite nature of human 
consciousness, and the precarious nature of man's career 
as finite spirit, than ever his predecessor did. 
In Schelling's insistence upon the unconscious nature 
of the self's activity lies an essential ambiguity which 
he senses, but cannot properly articulate or conceptually 
resolve. The realm of unconscious activity is equated 
with the transcendent principle, with an Absolute Identity, 
which is said to ground all consciousness and selfhood, 
but which is nonetheless "divided in the first act of 
. consciousness" (p. 209). Is not the classical notion of 
transcendence relativized in this equation, a notion to 
which Schelling seems to adhere, especially in his talk 
of system and the system-principle? A principle behind, 
perhaps beneath, consciousness is made a · principle over 
consciousness--in a philosophy that is nothing other than 
a system of human knowledge. 
Schelling cautions us, indeed, that questions about 
this Identity prior to consciousness, prior to the dialec­
tic of conscious and unconscious· activity, are ill-formed 
and inappropriate, "for it is that which can only reveal 
itself through self-consciousness, and cannot anywhere 
part company from this act" (p.· 234). Nonetheless in the 
historical perspective, questions do arise about the 
character of its transcendence, the status of its 
28The freedom, then, which .is all that supports this system of 
human consciousness and is its foundation (p. 35), turns out to be a 
purely formal freedom, synonymous with activity-as-such. It nowhere 
partakes of the attributes of conscious awareness and decision which, 
as Schelling realized in 1809 and thereafter, constitute human freedom. 
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relati.ve consciousness/unconsciousness: Is it beyond con­
sciousness, like a Platonic form, or beneath consciousness 
like Schopenhaue.r's primal will? Is its ineffability due 
to a surpassing character or to a privative one? It is 
indeed not clear from the, whole of the System whether we 
are dealing here with a spiritual transcendence, a prin­
ciple the classical traditions would name a cause of 
knowing and being known, or with a dark and essentially 
mute ground of activity or being, a ground only periph­
erally and fleetingly revealed in conscious awareness.29 
Schelling seems midway between a classifical philo­
sophy of transcendence as seen in Plotinus or Spinoza, 
where ultimate productive agency is indeed unconscious, 
but unconscious in the manner of pre-eminent and trans­
finite mentality, and the kind of material transcendence 
of Will or Being over its finite forms, voiced by 
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and in our day Heidegger. His 
"unconscious activity" is certainly not the intra-psychic 
and individual dynamism of conflict that Nietzsche and 
Freud were to descr,ibe, the source of repression, guilt 
or the life-poisoning "rancor against time." But by the 
same token it is not the conflict-free and benign princi­
ple of Neoplatonic emanation, nor a placid substance beyond 
knowledge, a resting and complete source of being such as 
Spinoza describes.· It is an activity and a principle of 
activity. It is in conflict with itself, at least 
potentially, so that its life can be spoken of as the 
unfolding of the infinite contradictions implicit within 
it. Schelling describes it as an act which is an infinity 
of actions, an absolute self-consciousness never realized 
definitively and exhaustively in any conscious awareness, 
but rather the life and source of the whole system of 
finitude• (pp. 49-50). It is a will which realizes itself 
only in the dialectic of the conscious and the unconscious, 
a self-finitizing infinity. 
In the System's notion of self-consciousness, the.re­
fore, we have a transcendent principle curiously trans­
formed and altered. In its very self or its transcendent 
aspect, absolute self-consciousness or Identity is wholly 
ineffable. The mechanism explanatory of all other intui­
tions, the principle of the graduated sequence of intui­
tions which collectively form the system, remains obscure 
and unilluminated. We do not see how the principle of 
the system of human knowledge is an act of knowledge-­
unless, as Schelling variously suggests, we have a vague 
adumbration of it as a genus or a type gathered from the 
29A crucial feature of Schelling's later metaphysics, begun 
with Of Human Freedom (1809) and Ages of the World (1815), is the 
distinction of two types of causality, the active causality of 
freedom or decisive will and the kind of material-temporal priority 
of antecedent over consequent which Schelling calls grounding. 
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total survey of its instances, in nature as well as in 
spirit (pp. 2-3), or else fashion some kind of analogy 
between this supremely active and creative cognition and 
the fashioning cognition of the artist lost in his work 
(pp. 75, 230). We can know and recognize some kind of 
absolute consciousness only in (or in between) the finite 
forms of consciousness and the succession of those forms. 
And what we recognize, in fact, is that there must be 
something like an absolute consciousness, 1.e.~know 
it as a postulate. 
Schelling propounds a radically finite model of con­
sciousness and (both in the spirit of Kant and on the 
model of the fragmentary system of reason suggested by 
the three Critiques) limits philosophical recognition to 
the finite modes of knowledge, taken singly and in the 
contingency of their succession in the "history of con­
sciousness." Before him, Fichte had searched for an 
absolute consciousness inside empirical consciousness 
. and for some kind of privileged access to it, whereby 
the heteronomy both of willing and of knowing would be 
abrogated, and consciousness accede to total self­
coincidence; The Science of Knowledge documents the ardor 
of his search, and its futility. Hegel was again to take 
up the task in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and with 
success, for in his stipulation that the principle of 
consciousness as such is a self-negating, finitizinl 
return to self, rather than the Fichtean identity o 
self-coincidence (I= I), he marries absolute conscious­
ness and finite consciousness--and provides a principle 
for the succession of its forms, a formula for their flow 
and transition, a matrix for their generation. It is 
this step, the transempirical formulation of a principle 
for the finitude of consciousness and for the succession 
of its forms, that the System lacks--or that it only 
programmatically adumbrates. The Sfstem's self-conscious­
ness is a plastic, flowing source o our knowledge and 
its indwelling realization, but it escapes formula, and 
thus transcends the realm of the intelligible and the 
expressible. Lacking the -self-negation and self-return 
that Hegel finally ascribes to consciousness, Schelling' s 
self-consciousness remains a principle of activity but 
not of knowledge. His self enacts the whole succession 
of finite, empirical forms of subJectivity and objec­
tivity without fully returning to itself, without 
definitively knowing its~lf. Spirit--as Schelling was 
obliged to conceive it from the basically Fichtean stand­
point of 1799--does not return to itself. Indeed, as he 
himself says, 
What we speak of as nature is a poem lying pent 
in a mysterious and wonderful script. Yet 
the riddle could reveal itself, were we to 
recognize in it the odyssey of the spirit, which, 
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marvellously deluded, seeks itself, and in seek­
ing flies from itself. (P. 232) 
Yet the spirit remained deluded, locked in the forms of 
finitude. In its alienation, in its inexplicable odyssey 
of self-objectification (p. 59), it can never find rest 
and full return. 
The self-consciousness of the Ststern, then, is a 
finitized transcendence, a real andasically unspiritual 
activity and source of realization such as Schelling was 
to later conceive under the names 'ground' and 'unground,' 
a restless, irresistible and infra-intelligible energi­
zation such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were subsequently 
to describe.30 Its life is essentially succession--pro­
ductivity splayed forth as time or the alteration of matter 
in nature, and as social mo~ement and political deed in 
history--change whose ultimate rational shape or purpose 
is, if admitted at all, said to be merely postulatory. 
Unlike the fully self-transparent Reason of the System of 
Identity and the Absolute Subject of Hegel's system, both 
of which live in a kind of eternity--the eternity of move­
ment completed, reality fully comprehended and rational­
ized--the self-consciousness of the system of Transcen­
dental Idealism is bound to time. The subject of the 
Hegelian system can be said to be fully itself while it 
is corning to itself, it lives its life as a play in and 
among appearances. Schelling's self-consciousness, how­
ever, is a principle never fully itself, never being but 
only becoming, essentially dependent upon appearances 
and the continued succession of appearances. For the 
author of the System, the self 1 s · life is time, and not a 
mathematicized interplay of eidetic shapes within time. 
The finite endures and resists inclusion within any 
arbitrary totalization. The odyssey of consciousness. 
ends, not with any grand rationalization of the universe, 
nor with the transition to any timeless and final logical 
language underpinning all, but with a recognition of the 
finite and fragmented textures of empirical reality and 
the multiplicity of its partial intelligible schemata. 
We are left with a history which equally shows 
flashes of senselessness and rationality (world political 
organization), whose goal and purpose cannot finally be 
decided, · and whose paradoxical mixture of voluntary co­
operation and external determination even philosophy can­
not sort out. We are left with a philosophy insufficiently 
aware of its principle to determine its own methodology, 
with a philosophy lacking intellectual intuition and 
depending instead .upon the surrogate of aesthetic intui­
tion. We are left finally, not with a monolithic system 
of human knowings, but with a multiplicity of intellectual 
approaches, a multiplicity of natural languages. 
30 See Of Human Freedom and'Ages of the World, 
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Science, art and philosophy remain sundered, and so the 
goal of fashioning one comprehensive metascience is not 
accomplished. But the solution Schelling envisages to 
this scandal of plurality is not to reduce and simplify. 
The System has accomplished all that a general and 
abstractive approach can do. What is needful now, says 
Schelling, is a turn to the concrete, the fabrication of 
a "new mythology,"31 the integration of the particularis­
tic 'knowing' of the arts with the conceptual generality 
of the sciences--a task not to be accomplished in thought 
alone, or by the philosopher in isolation, but one to be 
worked out by a "new race, personifying, as it were, one 
single poet," an accomplishment of history, not of 
thought alone (p. 233).32 
M.G. V. 
31A myth or its subject, the god or hero, plays the role of 
a concrete universal for Schelling. Concepts indicate with empty 
generality, but symbolic forms with absolute specificity. A myth 
is its meaning, and all science aspires to that exactitude. See 
The Philosophy of Art, s.w., v, 407-11. 
32The remark has political overtones . The 'new mythology' 
might well be the ideology of the Republican polity. Compare 
Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man. 
